University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1986 | Issue 1

Article 10

1986

WARC 1985: The Effects of an Equitable Access
Regime on Satellite Telecommunications Services
Eric D. Altholz
Eric.Altholz@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
Altholz, Eric D. (1986) "WARC 1985: The Effects of an Equitable Access Regime on Satellite Telecommunications Services,"
University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1986: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1986/iss1/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

WARC 1985: The Effects of an Equitable
Access Regime on
Satellite Telecommunication Services
INTRODUCTION

The world demand for telecommunication services is growing
rapidly, and with it the number of satellites necessary to meet that
demand. These telecommunications satellites are uniformly placed
in the Geostationary Orbit (GSO), a three dimensional orbital corridor circling the earth approximately 22,300 miles above the equator.' Because of its physical characteristics, the GSO provides the
ideal medium for the efficient and reliable transmission of information by satellite.2 There are, however, a variety of limitations on
the use of the GSO for satellite telecommunications.
The constraints of existing technology and international orbi-

James J. Gehrig, Geostationary Orbit: Technology and Law, in Proceedings of the
19th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 267, 268 (1976). There is a considerable body of
work on the geostationary orbit and its legal, political and technical implications. For concise and thoughtful discussions of the subject see: Stephen Gorove, Major Legal Issues Arising from the Use of the Geostationary Orbit, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 3; Stephen
Gorove, The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 Am. J. Int'l L. 444 (1979).
The following is a more general sampling of some of the work on the subject: Georgetown
Space Law Group, The Geostationary Orbit: Legal, Technical and Political Issues Surrounding Its Use In World Telecommunications, 16 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 223 (1984); Note,
Communications Satellites and the Geostationary Orbit: Reconciling Equitable Access with
Efficient Use, 14 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 859 (1982); Jan Busak, The Geostationary Satellite
Orbit: International Cooperation or National' Sovereignty, 45 Telecomm. J. 167 (1978);
Andrzej Gorbiel, The Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit: Some Remarks, 6 J. Space L.
171 (1978); Aldo Armando Cocca, Towards an Adequate Legal Regulation of the Geostationary Orbit, in Proceedings of the 20th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 193 (1977). A
classic treatise on the implications of the development of a body of law on outer space is
Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Ivan A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space
(1963).
' The GSO has the valuable property of allowing a satellite to maintain a fixed position
relative to the Earth's surface. Because a communications satellite in the GSO has "visible"
to it (and is visible from) roughly one-third of the earth's surface, three coordinated satellites broadcasting on the same frequency can provide global coverage. See Nicolaeus Matte,
Aerospace Law: Telecommunications Satellites 7 (1982). These features of the GSO make it
ideal for use by providers of telecommunications services, because there is no need for sophisticated and costly radar tracking systems which would otherwise be necessary to follow
the satellite through its orbit and coordinate the transmission of signals when the satellite is
within range of the sending or receiving station. Telecommunications satellites can be
placed strategically in the geostationary orbital plane to allow constant access and stability
of location.
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tal spacing regulations require that geostationary satellites be approximately 460 to 500 miles away from each other if they are to
receive and send signals without unacceptable levels of interference.3 Conservative estimates indicate, therefore, that approximately 180 telecommunications satellites can operate successfully
in the GSO.' Well over 100 systems are already in place and various studies have projected that, at present growth rates, as many
as.239 to 400 space stations would occupy geostationary orbital positions by the early 1990s.5 The results of this growth have been
increasing resource scarcity, orbit and radio-frequency congestion
and higher levels of interference in transmission. The recent expansion of domestic satellite services, particularly in the industrialized countries, has exacerbated the problem of congestion, particularly in certain regions.6
' See Delbert D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy 26 (1979). Frequency interference is the most basic limitation on the number of space stations that can
operate effectively in the GSO. The International Frequency Regulation Board (IFRB) continues to recommend a minimum angular distance (radial separation) between telecommunications satellites of approximately 1.20, or about 480 miles, for the purpose of controlling
the levels of frequency interference which affect operating systems. The amount of interference, and therefore the distance necessary to limit it, is largely a function of the so-called
radiation characteristics of Earth and space station antennas and transmitters, as well as
the constraints of technology. See Gehrig, Geostationary Orbit at 269 (cited in note 1).
See Smith, Space Stations at 26 (cited in note 3). More optimistic estimates have
ranged as high as 1800, but a United Nations study has concluded that no credible determination of precisely how many satellites could occupy the GSO could be made. United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Physical and Technical Attributes of
the Geostationary Orbit, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/203 at 7 (1977). Underlying the more conservative estimates is the belief that technology will not be able to develop rapidly enough
to overcome existing resource constraints in the near future, either because of natural constraints or because of restrictions imposed by an international plan alloting positions in the
GSO.
5 See Gehrig, Geostationary Orbit (cited in note 1) citing H.L. Myers, Geosynchronous
Platform Definition, a Study (June 1977).
' For instance, there are four domestic satellite systems which service the United
States: Western Union's WESTAR, RCA Americom's SATCOM, Comsat General's COMSTAR, and Satellite Business System's Digital/Ku-Band. Five new "domsat" systems have
received FCC approval and are in various stages of production by ATT, GTE Satellite,
Hughes Aircraft, Spacecom, and Southern Pacific Communications. Other major domestic
systems include Canada's ANIK, the Soviet Union's MOLNIA, India's INSAT, and Indonesia's PALAPA.
The problem of congestion is most acute in those portions of the orbital arc which lie
over heavily populated regions, such as Europe, where most of the service-providing satellites are clustered. Over certain areas, the angular distance between satellites in the GSO
(radial separation) is gradually approaching the minimum required to limit interference to
acceptable levels. (See discussion of radial separation in note 3). If the stations were evenly
spaced in the orbit, this would leave a radial separation of only 1.50, a mere 0.30 more than
the presently permitted minimum. Gehrig, Geostationary Orbit at 269-270 (cited in note 1);
Richard R. Colino, INTELSAT: Facing the Challenge of Tomorrow, 39 J. Int'l Aff. 129, 131
4
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Until recently, no international organization assigned geostationary orbital positions to providers of satellite communications
services. Although the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) recorded the positions of existing satellites and coordinated
the frequencies at which they transmitted, it had no power to assign orbital positions. When a nation or other organization planned
to launch a satellite, it simply chose whatever unoccupied GSO position and radio-frequency it deemed best given the intended service areas, and complied with ITU notification and coordination
procedures7 prior to occupying the position. Both because providers could obtain orbital positions simply by occupying them, and
because no international lawmaking body could compel any service
provider to move a satellite once it was placed in orbit (to make
room for a newcomer) this method of assigning orbital positions
and broadcasting frequencies has been characterized as "first
come, first served."
This first come, first served regime generally operated to the
benefit of developed countries which constantly sought orbital positions and were capable of using them immediately. As the number of satellites in the GSO grew nearer the limits imposed by existing technology and the physical attributes of radio signals, many
Third World nations lacking the technology to launch telecommunications satellites, but hoping to be able to do so them in the future, began to object. Third World nations feared that their present inability to launch satellites would preclude them from ever
doing so. Under the first come, first served method of distribution,
the GSO may be entirely filled before they obtain the necessary
technology. Complicating the issue is the fact that most lesser-developed countries (LDCs) lack the terrestrial communications infrastructure upon which to develop a modern communications system." For LDCs, therefore, the development of satellite
telecommunications capability would radically advance their ability to create a domestic communications network on a par with
those enjoyed by developed countries, providing them with an opportunity to "leap-frog" over their outmoded systems of terrestrial
relay links.' The importance of satellite telecommunications to the

,(1985).
See International Telecommunications Union Radio Regulations, arts. 3-9A. The
Radio Regulations are contained in International Telecommunication Union, World Administrative Radio Conference Radio Regulations (1979) (the "Radio Regulations").
8 Glen 0. Robinson, Regulating the International Airwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 Va. J.
Int'l L. 1, 18 (1980).
9 Id. at 19. Robinson sees the development of satellite communications capability by
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internal development of Third World countries cannot be
overemphasized.
In the 1970s, to foreclose the possibility that they will be frozen out of the GSO by advanced countries, Third World nations
began to mobilize within the ITU to develop a regulatory regime of
"equitable access" to the GSO. Such a regime would grant a minimum number of GSO slots and radio-frequencies to every ITU
member nation regardless of whether it then has the technology
necessary to utilize them. In effect, slots in the GSO would be reserved for use by the LDCs.
Western industrialized nations have attacked equitable access
proposals, defending the adequacy of the existing regime. They argue that a system of equitable access would be inefficient: by denying orbital slots to countries prepared to use them immediately,
and reserving them instead to nations currently unable to utilize
them, growing demand would go unserviced despite the fact that
the capital and technology exists to do so.
At the August 1985 meeting of the ITU World Administrative
Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit
and the Space Services Utilizing It ("WARC ORB-I"), the member
states reached a technically and politically responsive compromise
between these two positions. WARC ORB-1 produced a "dual allotment plan" for the regulated use of the GSO and the radio-frequency spectrum. The plan was designed to "guarantee in practice" equitable access to those resources for all nations, while
providing for a planning scheme considered by the ITU to be sufficiently flexible to accomodate changing needs and technological
progress.' 0
This comment will examine the recent development of the
principle of equitable access to the GSO and the radio frequency
spectrum as the theoretical underpinning of WARC ORB-1 and assess the potential impact of the outcome of the conference on
growth in trade in telecommunications services. The comment will
first discuss the role of the ITU in regulating the use of satellites in
the GSO. It will then review the development of the principle of
equitable access and examine four possible resource planning alternatives, the principles of which are, to varying degrees, embodied
in the "dual plan" which was adopted at WARC ORB-1. It will
conclude that while the ITU's "dual plan" addresses the political
LDCs as playing a crucial role in movement toward a new international information order.
'o International Telecommunications Union, Press Release (ITU/85-15) 2 (Sept. 16,
1985) (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
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problems posed by the use of the orbit/spectrum resource, and
does so in a technically feasible manner, the contemplated use of a
priori planning may hinder growth in trade in telecommuncations
services."
I.

THE

ITU's

REGULATION OF SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The ITU, which has functioned as the regulatory and coordinating body for radio and telephone communications since 1865,
became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1947 pursuant to the passage of the International Telecommunications Convention at the Atlantic City Plenipotentiary Conference of that
year. 2 Between 1947 and 1979,'3 it was the primary task of the
ITU and its various organs to manage the use of the radio-frequency spectrum among its 154 member countries. This "frequency management" function included: (1) regulating the uses of
the frequency spectrum by providers of terrestrial communications
services and, over time, providers of space services; and (2) allocating portions of the resource between the two service sectors.1 4
To carry out its task, the ITU promulgated the Radio Regulations which collectively constitute a multilateral agreement with

" Many of the governmentally constructed barriers in trade to telecommunications
services which operate to hinder growth in the provision of telecommunications worldwide
are discussed in Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. National Study on
Trade in Services 44-45, 123-128 (1984). See also Geza Feketekuty and Jonathan David Aronson, Restrictions on Trade in Communication and Information Services, 1984 Mich. Y.B.
Int'l Legal Stud. 145.
"1 International Telecommunications Convention, 63 Stat. 1399, T.I.A.S. No. 1901, 30
U.N.T.S. 316 (signed Oct. 2, 1947). The classic, if somewhat dated, exposition of the history
of the ITU and its mission as an international regulatory body is David M. Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law: The Regulation of the Radio Spectrum
(1970). See also Subraka K. Sarkar, Introduction to Space Telecommunications Regulations,
in Proceedings of the 21st Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 2 (1978).
" See discussion of WARC 1979 in text at notes 34-53.
'4 Under Article 4 of the 1973 International Telecommunication Convention and Final
Protocol, it is the charge of the ITU to:
(1) effect allocation of the radio-frequency spectrum and registration of radio-frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of
different countries; and
(2) coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of different countries and to improve the use made of the radio-frequency spectrum.
International Telecommunications Convention, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 (signed
Oct. 25 1973) ("1973 ITU Convention"). It is useful to define three terms of art that are
used frequently in discussions of ITU regulations. "Allocation" denotes the distribution of a
frequency band to a particular service, "allotment" the distribution of resources exclusively
to an area or country, and "assignment" a distribution to an individual station. Robinson,
21 Va. J. Int'l L. at 10, n. 29 (cited in note 8).
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the legal force of a treaty among ITU members. 5 The supreme organ of the ITU is its Plenipotentiary Conference, which convenes
periodically to consider large revisions of the Radio Regulations, as
well as the adoption of the various regulations, resolutions and recommendations which emerge from the more frequently convened
ITU World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs).' e The
main work of international telecommunications regulation, however, is done at the WARCs. These intergovernmental conferences
operate according to the principle of one state, one vote, and address issues ranging from new frequency allocations among satellite
services to the approval of technical parameters for satellite operations. The frequency allocations determined by a WARC are given
effect by the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB)
which records national frequency assignments as well as national
assignments of geostationary orbital positions. The IFRB's primary
task is to ensure against the generation of harmful frequency interference among the various services (e.g., fixed, mobile/maritime,
and broadcast) as well as among regions and states serviced by
17
them.
II.

THE DECLINE OF "FIRST COME, FIRST SERVED" AND THE RISE
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE

A.

ACCESS

Procedures and Politics

Among the most important of the Radio Regulations are the
procedures for notification of the use, and subsequent coordination, of radio-frequencies. These procedures are designed to provide an administrative check on the man-made causes of harmful
interference in the space service. Prior to obtaining and registering
the use of a frequency band for space stations, prospective entrants must engage in procedures to coordinate the transmission
frequencies of their proposed satellites with those of other ITU
members, whose existing systems might be interfered with.18 The
Radio Regulations in effect today make voluntary the coordination

"' Gorove, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 7 (cited in note 1). The various "resolutions" and "recommendations" adopted by the ITU and its organs, on the other hand, are
regarded as expressions of opinion, and purely advisory.
"' The regulations adopted at the WARCs, once imposed, have the force of treaties
and, like treaties, are frequently subject to "reservations" filed by states. Id. See also Arnold A, Matthey, International Legislation in Relation to Space Radiocommunications, 52
Telecomm. J. 341, 346-47 (1985).
"' 1973 ITU Convention at art. 15 (cited in note 14).
18 Id.
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and adjustment of existing satellites by the owner(s) of those stations to reduce interference between their systems and the newly
proposed ones. Needless to say, this sort of accommodation of new
entrants is encouraged and facilitated by the ITU. In practice,
however, the burden of adjustment-of both frequency and orbital
position-rests entirely on the newcomer.
Developing countries were just beginning to consider the possibility of using satellites for domestic communication when the
presently effective Radio Regulations were approved at the 1971
World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications (WARC-ST). 19 They opposed the regulations, arguing that
the burden on satellite telecommunications newcomers to coordinate their new systems with existing ones, and to make any necessary interference-reducing adjustments, amounted to a "first come,
first served" system under which orbital access could be denied
them indefinitely. Despite official ITU statements that "the utilization and exploitation of the frequency spectrum be . . . based on
principles of justice and equity,""0 Third World nations became increasingly convinced that the first registered user of a frequency
band and geostationary orbital position would have an exclusive
claim to the position occupied by the satellite broadcasting on that
frequency.2
The characterization of the coordination, notification, and registration procedures as a first come, first served regime is somewhat inaccurate in the sense that the 1971 procedures do not give
any long-term legal rights to the first user of any GSO position.
Since the adoption of the registration procedures, ITU officials
have consistently maintained that they were not intended to, and
in fact do not, impose such a first come, first served regime. The
ITU clarified its official position at the WARC-ST in Resolution
Spa 2-1, adopted at the same session in which it approved the
procedures.
Resolution Spa 2-1 provided that registration with the ITU
"should not provide any permanent priority for any individual
country or groups of countries and should not create an obstacle to

"
Final Acts, World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications,
23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 8572. The procedures took effect in 1973.
'0 Final Acts, Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference, Res. No. 10a (Geneva,
1963).
" For a terse but informative treatment of the Third World formulations of their positions at that time see Jonathan F. Galloway, The Current Status of the Controversy Over
the Geostationary Orbit, in Proceedings of the 21st Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space
22 (1978).
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the establishment of space systems by other countries."22 Similarly, after the 1973 International Telecommunications Convention, the Secretary-General of the ITU told the U.N. Committee
on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that "international registration of
frequency assignments [does] not give permanent priority to any
country or group of countries."2 Moreover, prior use by an incumbent does not in itself foreclose subsequent use by a newcomer:24
minor adjustments can be made to accommodate newcomers, and
it has been the task of the IFRB to facilitate the making of such
adjustments through technical assistance to the parties involved.
Still, because it relies on voluntary coordination the system
does in practice place the ultimate burden of adjustment exclusively on the GSO newcomer. The effect of this system is aptly
illustrated by the experiences of India and Indonesia when they
attempted to coordinate their proposed domestic satellite systems
with those which would be affected by their entry into the area-in
this case INTELSAT (the International Telecommunciations Satellite Organization)2 5 and STATIONAR (a Soviet Union regional
system). Both incumbents refused to make the minor adjustments
requested of them by the new entrants and the IFRB.2 After extensive and fruitless negotiation, Indonesia obtained "access" to a
radio frequency only by leasing INTELSAT circuits. In spite of the
fact that STATIONAR could have eliminated difficulties between

" International Telecommunications Union, World Administrative Radio Conference
for Space Telecommunications, Res. Spa 2-1, par. 1 (1971).
13 Carl Q. Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space 511 (1982), Hearings of the United States Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/C.2/SR.258, p.6 (May 20, 1976) (Statements of Robert E. Butler).
11 Robinson, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. at 11 n. 35 (cited in note 8).
,5INTELSAT is an intergovernmental organization, established by treaty in 1964, that
owns and operates a fleet of communications satellites. Its satellite system is used by 165
countries for international communications links as well as domestic service. Colino, 39 J.
Int'l Aff. at 129 (cited in note 6). INTELSAT operates as a non-profit cooperative with 109
current members. Id. at 130.
There is no doubt INTELSAT has fulfilled its role of providing relatively affordable
service to developing countries, while at the same time providing crucial international links
to other telecommunications providers. However, the guaranteed availability of orbital positions and frequency bands to present lessees of INTELSAT circuits will reduce their demand for those circuits in the future. Moreover, given the increased availability of satellite
technology in the world market, and in light of the impending implementation of the ITU's
dual plan, the role of INTELSAT as a global non-profit provider of common-user satellite
services may well be called into question. Thus the new ability of many present lessees to
provide their own domestic service may justify a reduction in the presence of INTELSAT in
the GSO, and the distribution of its vacated positions among private firms.
26In both cases the incumbent would have had to replace a direct connection with an
indirect one, but any reduction in the quality of the service as a result was unlikely.
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its own system and India's at a relatively low cost, India incurred
considerable expense in making adjustments that would permit its
INSAT system to function over its territory without interfering
with STATIONAR transmissions."
The experiences of India and Indonesia, evidence of rapidly
expanding use of the GSO and frequency spectrum, and pressure
from Third World countries for a system that would protect their
interests led the ITU to initiate the transformation of its operating
arrangements. At the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference, the ITU
voted to amend Article 33 of its Convention to reflect the realization that the physical media of satellite telecommunications are
scarce resources, and to make clear the intention of its membership to eliminate "first come, first served" regulation of the orbit/
spectrum. Under the 1973 amendment ITU instructed its members
who use frequency bands for space radio services to:
bear in mind that radio-frequencies and the geostationary orbit are limited natural resources [which] must be used efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to both in conformity with the
Radio Regulations and according to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal."
Even after the 1973 amendment, the Third World members of
the ITU continued to focus on the domination of the GSO by developed countries-a domination perpetuated by the ever-expanding market for satellite telecommunications services of all
kinds. Continued fears of orbital exclusion grew into an issue upon
which Third World countries with divergent interests could coalesce again. At the 1982 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi,29 the language of Article 33 was strengthened by its amendment to explicitly take into account "the special needs of the
developing countries and the geographical situation of particular
countries."°
As amended, Article 33 manifests the concern of the ITU that
27 A.M. Rutkowski, Six Ad-Hoc Two: The Third World Speaks Its Mind, Satellite
Comm. 22, 23 (March 1980).
" 1973 ITU Convention at art. 33 (emphasis added) (cited in note 14).
The Plenipotentiary Conference, generally convened every five to seven years is the
supreme organ of the ITU and is empowered to revise the ITU Convention. See Leive, International Telecommunications at 32 (cited in note 12).
SO International Telecommunications Convention, Final Protocol (Nairobi, 1982)
("1982 ITU Convention"). This change was made pursuant to the change of policy signaled
by the adoption of Resolution BP at the 1979 WARC. For a discussion of Resolution BP see
text at notes 47-53.
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its Third World members not be excluded from the GSO by its
more technologically advanced members." For if the words "limited natural resource ''13 are intended to inform the scope of acceptable use of the orbit/spectrum resource, "efficiently and economically" and "equitable access" are intended to inform the manner of
use. Arguably, prior to the amendment of Article 33, it was not
properly the function of the ITU to direct the use of the GSO in
any manner other than through the distribution of frequency assignments and the recording of orbital positions. The language of
Article 33, however, strongly suggests that the ITU, in fulfilling its
commitment to both "equitable and efficient use," is now to regulate the placement of satellites in the orbit. It seems both 'necessary and proper' for the ITU to have the power to do so if it is to
realize the goals set by its membership. The assertions of prominent members of the scientific community regarding the inseparability of the GSO and the radio frequency spectrum, as well as resolutions and recommendations of past administrative radio
conferences, all suggest that regulating access to the GSO must
now become part of the ITU's regulatory role. 3
3' Some Third World countries, such as India and Brazil, do have domestic satellite
systems. Those without the resources to launch a system can secure domestic service
through INTELSAT circuit leasing (e.g., Indonesia's PALAPA system was formed on leased
circuits).
" For an exhaustive discussion of the meanings and international legal implications of
the terms "limited," "natural," and "resource" as used in the context of other ITU agreements see Christol, Law of Outer Space at 453-457 (cited in note 23).
11 The Final Acts of the 1977 WARC-BS, for example, out of which emerged a comprehensive plan for the use of the orbit/spectrum resource by the BSS, included certain recommendations that demonstrated the commitment of the ITU to regulate the use of the orbit
specifically and not merely the use of the radio frequency spectrum. Recommendation HH,
for example, suggested that the then upcoming Region 2 conference "draw up a detailed
plan for the orbit/spectrum resource available for the broadcasting satellite service in the
11.7-12.2 GHz band." The recommendation was quite specific in denoting the nature of
the plan:
The plan shall provide for the detailed assignment of the orbital positions and frequency channels available, ensuring that the broadcasting-satellite service requirements submitted by the various administrations are met in an equitable manner satisfactory to all the countries concerned. It should be laid down as a matter of principle
that each administration in the Region should be guaranteed a minimum number of
channels [4] for the operation of the broadcasting-satellite service. Above this minimum, the special characteristics of the countries (size, time zones, language differences,
etc.) shall be taken into account.
Final Acts, International Telecommunications Union, Recommendation HH (Geneva 1977);
M. Mili, World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the Broadcast-Satellite
Service in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in
Region 1), in Proceedings of the 20th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 346, 354, 358
(1977). Moreover, if, as many scientists maintain, there really is an inextricable relationship
between the GSO and the radio frequency spectrum (see, e.g., Subraka K. Sarkar, Geosta-
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One question clearly emerged from the terms of Article 33:
could efficient and economic use be reconciled with equitable access, or has the ITU proclaimed mutually exclusive criteria for the
use of the orbit/spectrum? The 1979 World Administrative Radio
Conference laid the groundwork upon which WARC ORB-1 would
address this question.

III.

THE

1979 WARC

The ITU's regulation of the GSO began to change at the 1979
WARC, the largest and perhaps most comprehensive conference of
its kind convened in the history of the ITU. 34 Significantly, WARC
'79 was the first conference at which LDCs outnumbered developed countries. Indeed, certain observers predicted that the conference would see the LDC agenda for a New International Economic Order and a New World Information Order35 brought into
discussions of global telecommunications regulation." In contrast
to the technical subjects dominating most ITU conferences, politically motivated proposals made their way onto the conference
tionary Orbital Positions for Space Stations, in Proceedings of the 20th Colloquium on the
Law of Outer Space 450, 453 (1977)), it is appropriate for the ITU to have the power to
regulate and allocate both. To regulate one but not the other would be at best inefficient
and at worst ineffective.
3' The conference
brought together 1600 delegates from 142 ITU member countries
and international organizations. It is of interest to note that, in at least one author's opinion, INTELSAT, which provides two-thirds of the world's intercontinental and transoceanic
telephone communications, practically all of its television broadcasts, and a substantial portion of its domestic broadcasts, already speaks with greater authority on satellite communications issues than any member country." A.M. Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative
Radio Conference: The ITU in a Changing World, 13 Int'l Law. 289, 299 (1979).
31 On the NIEO, see Club of Rome, Reshaping the International Order (1976); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, Gen. Assem. Res. 3201,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/3201 (6th Special Session 1974). On the NWIO, see Mustapha Masmoudi,
The New World Information Order (1978), prepared for the International Commission for
the Study of Communication Problems. Briefly, the NWIO has been identified as the "international exchange of information in which states, which develop their cultural system in an
autonomous way and with complete sovereign control of resources, fully and effectively participate as independent members of the international community." Cees J. Hamelink, The
New International Economic Order and the New International Information Order 8 (undated). Enhancing the ability of LDCs to maintain cultural integrity in the face of the cultural intrusions made possible by broadcast satellites, has been a central aspect of the
NWIO agenda. For an analysis of the recent Third World movement known as the New
International Communications Order see generally Paris Arnopoulos, The International
Politics of the Orbit/Spectrum Issue, 7 Ann. Air & Space L. 215 (1982).
" Rutkowski observed that the ITU's equal representation voting principles (one vote
per member) make it a natural and effective forum in which LDCs can pursue their policy
goals. Rutkowski, 13 Int'l Law. at 294 (cited in note 34). This is particularly true since the
ITU is a relatively issue-specific forum (compared to many others in the international scene)
and, like the General Assembly of the U.N., is governed by the principle of majority rule.
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floor, to the dismay of not a few western delegations 3 7 as LDCs
took advantage of the forum of WARC '79 to call into question
some of the basic tenets of international satellite regulation.3
Still, in the opinion of the Chairman of the United States delegation to the Conference, "[t]he 1979 WARC was not required or
expected to establish new principles of spectrum use; its task was
to adjust, at the margin, existing regulations governing spectrum
allocations and use to accommodate new and future requirements. ' 39 Nevertheless, while this may have characterized the
American perception of the Conference, the floor debates and the
Final Acts themselves spanned well beyond technical issues due
largely to the influence of politics. Two aspects of the 1979 WARC
are most relevant for this discussion: its decisions regarding the
allocation of frequencies for various satellite services, and its
movement toward revision of both the general principles for allocation and orbital utilization, and the specific procedures for coordination, notification, registration, and enforcement of assignments. 0
A.

Allocations to the Fixed Satellite Service

It was generally agreed that to meet the rapidly expanding demand for voice and data transmission, the Fixed Satellite Service
(FSS) needed additional allocations both in frequencies reserved
for its exclusive use and in shared frequencies. Yet the question of
which bands to allocate was a point of contention at the 1979
WARC. The resolution of this controversy reveals much about the
allocation of power in the ITU after 1979.
Due to the competing needs of other communications services,
particularly in the politically sensitive area of military radar transmission requirements, there was considerable controversy concern31 Indian delegations have often assumed a leadership role among the nations of
the
Third World. At the 1977 WARC-BS, for example, the Indian delegation issued a strongly
worded political demand for an a priori allotment plan for the BSS. Rutkowski, 13 Int'l
Law. at 294 (cited in note 34).
8 Commenting on events at the 1977 WARC-BS, FCC Commissioner Lee said that the
excessive "political action" of the Third World at the conference should cause the United
States to "reassess the suitability of its present role in the ITU" and to "look for an alternative forum to resolve the kinds of issues that the ITU was once attuned to handle." George
A. Codding, The United States and the ITU in a Changing World, 44 Telecomm. J. 231
(1977).
39 Robinson, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. at 6 (cited in note 8).
" The implications of the revision of allocation principles was also of concern to U.S.
lawmakers at that time. See Christol, Law of Outer Space at 583-584 (cited in note 23),
citing U.S. Department of State, Reports Submitted to Congress Pursuant to the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 95-426) 89 (1979).
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ing the allocation of frequencies below 10 GHz (particularly in the
3 and 4 GHz bands which are the primary military radar bands). 1
Additional allocations below 10 GHz would have crowded and adversely affected the terrestrial services using those bands-services
whose representatives had already begun to object to the incursions made by the FSS into their bands.2 Although allocations
above the 10 GHz band would have resulted in far less congestion
during the near future, such allocations would have imposed increased costs-due to the greater expense of designing and manufacturing higher frequency transmitting satellites-on INTELSAT
and other entities in the developed countries which were presently
developing new FSS systems in lower frequencies. 3
The LDC membership supported a plan, put forward by the
Indian delegation, to downgrade allocations in the 3 GHz band to
make room for increased use by the FSS. This proposal was vigorously opposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
many of the other NATO-aligned countries at the Conference, because it would have involved the reduction of their defensive radar
systems to secondary status, requiring those systems to modify
their operations so as to avoid interference with the primary status
transmissions of the FSS."
The United States was able to defeat the Indian proposal by
announcing that even if the ITU adopted it, the U.S. would not
respect the allocation within its own borders; this in turn would
effectively prevent INTELSAT from respecting the allocation and
preventing Third World nations from actually using the frequencies allocated. 45 In the end a compromise was reached which permitted the FSS and military radar systems to co-exist in the lower
bandwidths, and obliged radar deploying countries to attempt to
readjust broadcast frequencies in the near future.
This episode demonstrates that the West retains significant
power in the ITU despite the existence of a non-western majority.
Yet it also demonstrates the limits of that power. The U.S. was
able to block adoption of the Indian proposal only by threatening
to ignore the ITU's decision. As recent U.S. experience in other
areas has demonstrated,"" threatening even partial withdrawal

" Robinson, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. at 21-22 (cited in note 8).
"' Id. at 20.
13 Id. at 21.
44

Id. at 21-22.
at 21.

45 Id.

46 For example, see U.N Set to Vote on Sea Law Treaty U.S. Opposes, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 30, 1982, sect. 1, p. 1, col. 3 ("[A]s long as the U.S. remains aloof, the force of the treaty
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from an international organization, or noncompliance with such an
organization's decisions, is a policy instrument which loses all force
once withdrawal is complete. In addition, the U.S. "threat" was
successful only because its finance-based influence within INTELSAT gave the U.S. the power to disrupt the solution the ITU coalition-majority would otherwise have chosen. This suggests that
when the U.S. lacks the power to control assets critical to other
ITU members, its ability to avoid defeat in the ITU will be
diminished.
B.

Planning Future Space Services and Resolution BP

A substantial amount of time at the 1979 WARC was spent
considering proposals by LDCs to convene a conference for the sole
purpose of adopting a "plan" to govern use of the orbit/spectrum
resource by space services. 7 While there was support for some sort
of planning regime even among the developed countries, that support was neither dedicated nor unified. Even among those agreeing
in principle that planning was desirable, there was disagreement
over which services should be subject to planning, which frequency
bands should be alloted, and the extent to which planning should
occur in advance of actual use.
In an effort to link planning conference proposals more clearly
to the politics ostensibly embraced by Article 33 of the 1982 Convention, the Equatorial states introduced a proposal calling for the
adoption of regulations "guaranteeing rational and equitable access" to the GSO. 4 1 The various proposals offered and the principles which they encompassed, led to the adoption of Resolution
BP (also referred to as Resolution 3) of the 1979 Final Acts, "Relating to the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and to the
9
Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It.'
Over the objection of many industrialized nations led by the
U.S., Resolution BP endorsed the principle of a priori planning,
mandating that a planning conference be convened to "decide
which [rather than whether] space services and frequency bands
should be planned. '50 This planning conference would attempt to
is likely to remain in doubt."); U.S. Affirms Plan to Leave Unesco at End of Month, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1984, sect. 1, p. 1, col. 6.
" For a summary of proposals introduced by Iraq, India and the People's Republic of
China see, Robinson, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. at 27 nn. 79-81 (cited in note 8).
'

Id. at 26 n. 74.

, Final Acts, ITU World Administrative Radio Conference, Resolution BP-1 (Geneva,
1979).
" Id. (emphasis added).
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"guarantee in practice for all countries equitable access to the geostationary-satellite orbit and the frequency bands allocated to
space services." 5 ' In the end, therefore, "the means employed to
contain, if not resolve, the divergent social, political, economic, legal and security considerations which were manifested in 1979 was
'52
the agreement to convene another conference.
The challenge facing delegates to the 1985 conference, therefore, was to overcome the national and political differences which
had become almost endemic to the debate over international satellite regulation. Yet the scope of disagreement in 1985 would be
narrower in at least one significant respect: Resolution BP had
cleared the way for the acceptance of some form of a priori
allotment.
By the end of the Conference, it became clear-if there ever
was any doubt-that all national service requirements would
steadily increase, and that the real needs, of LDCs would arise and
command new attention in the near future. The various coalitions
responded with proposed solutions which addressed their respective policy objectives. The advanced countries tried to convince
LDCs that they would be willing and able to meet the service
needs of LDCs as they arose.5 3 The LDCs, however, pushed for varying degrees of resource allotment planning and regulatory restraint of over-exploitation by advanced countries.
IV.

ALLOTMENT PLANNING: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS

In preparing for the 1985 WARC, the International Radio
Consultative Committee (CCIR) 5' and the various national delegations-recognizing that technological progress would permit some
improvements in the efficiency and quality of service regardless of
regulatory constraints-considered orbit/spectrum planning arrangements along a continuum of alternatives. At one end of the
continuum were rigid, long-term allotment plans which would essentialiy divide the resource "equitably" among all the ITU members. At the other end were plans to provide global telecommunications services either through regulated institutional providers

5, Id.
" Robinson, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. at 36 (cited in note 8).
" Christol, Law of Outer Space at 592 (cited in note 23).
54 The CCIR is the permanent organ of the ITU primarily responsible for undertaking
and presenting technical studies relating to the standardization of equipment, systems, and
their operation, and to the general use of telecommunications in outer space. See Leive,
International Telecommunications at 33 (cited in note 12).
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which could meet national needs for services as they arose, or
through the creation of an equitably managed "resource pool"
under close ITU regulation. In between these alternatives was the
option of guaranteeing access through ongoing multilateral coordinating conferences. Before examining the solution chosen by the
ITU at WARC ORB-i, these four generic types of plans will be

reviewed."
An evaluation of the various resource distribution schemes
must take into account the divergent and competing interests of
advanced countries and LDCs. The interests of the advanced countries are characterized by the desire to maintain "open access" 56 to
the orbit/spectrum-continued availability of a large number of
positions to handle the growing demand for services is a rational
policy goal for countries with the current capacity to provide service. Third World countries, on the other hand, are primarily interested in the provision of limited resource access opportunities
through the guaranteed assignments of at least one position to
each ITU member country: "equitable access" according to rights
as well as needs.
Omnipresent is the question of which plan will most likely
lead to efficient use-allowing maximum access to the resource,
and flexible application of technological developments, over a long
period of time with only optimal levels of interference-without
sacrificing the goal of equitable access.
A. Detailed Allotment Plans
A detailed allotment plan would closely resemble the plan devised at the 1977 Conference for the Broadcast-Satellite Service
(BSS). s7 Such a plan would assign each ITU member the right to
transmit on certain frequencies which would be associated with
specific orbital positions to which the assignee would be entitled
during the stated period. "In essence, this approach entails decid11 These and other plans were developed by the CCIR in Technical Bases for the
World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Orbit and the
Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It [WARC ORB-1]: Report of the CCIR Conference
Preparatory Meeting, pt. II, pp. 127-177 (Joint Meeting Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 19 and
11) (Geneva, June 25-July 20, 1984). For a description of the various plans and their attributes see Martin A. Rothblatt, The Space WARC: International Accommodations for Satellite Communications, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 13, 19-29 (1984).
" Rothblatt, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 19 (cited in note 55).
57 Under that plan, each member country received four BSS satellite assignments per
time zone (within its borders) for twenty years. See Richard E. Butler, World Administrative Radio Conference for Planning Broadcast Satellite Service, 5 J. Space L. 93, 98 (1977).
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ing how many satellite assignments are possible within existing
technology and then apportioning these assignments among countries for a long period of time."58 Such a plan would also establish
technical operational parameters (or, more likely, parameter
ranges) to govern the use of the alloted frequencies and orbital
slots. These parameters would prevent systems from becoming so
powerful that they could override the signals of less powerful satellites by limiting the application of technologies used to that end.
Detailed allotment plans would tend to increase inefficiency in
the use of the orbit/spectrum resource. Since many of the recipients of assignments would possess neither the technological nor the
capital resources required to create even the most basic geostationary satellite system, they would likely warehouse their assignments, while others with the resources to establish a satellite system would be prevented from doing so because of their inability to
gain access to the medium of satellite telecommunications. 59 This
result would tend to hinder growth in the international telecommunications market.
A restrictive plan that permits LDCs to make "reservations"
for orbital positions and frequency assignments necessarily limits
the availability of technically feasible positions to technology-rich
countries which are in a position to provide international telecommunications service in addition to meeting their own domestic
needs. This method of guaranteeing that the LDCs will have access
to the GSO in the long-run, therefore, may well limit their access
to telecommunications services in the short-run. Thus there seems
to be a trade-off between the short-run goal of maximizing access
to telecommunications services and the long-term goal of maximizing LDC access to the means which will enable them to provide
those services for themselves.
The central weakness of any detailed allotment plan arises out
of its inability to make the best use of technological progress. Since
the assignments are made a priori-inadvance of the need for and
ability to use the assignment-and are intended to be of long duration, most technological developments that would enable the orbit/
spectrum to accommodate greater traffic capacity at decreased unit
costs would for a time go unused, to the detriment of all providers
and consumers of telecommunications services. Moreover, since the
technical parameters devised to govern the use of each allotment
are limited by the level of technology at the time of the initial al8 Rothblatt, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 20 (cited in note 55).
69 Id.
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lotments, it is conceivable that even the ability of individual providers to improve their efficiency and channel capacity within an
allotment would be limited by these parameters. This discourages
efforts to develop new technologies which, although beneficial to
telecommunications, may require operational conditions at variance with established parameters."
B. Multilateral Coordination
Advance distribution of assignments to all countries is rejected
under the multilateral coordination model.6 This approach seeks
to guarantee access opportunities for new satellite systems by requiring ongoing meetings between newcomers and the owners of
existing satellite systems which would be affected by the operation
of the new system. These meetings would also be able to make use
of evolving technology to accommodate new requirements, thereby
minimizing the drain on orbit/spectrum availability.6 2 This regulatory mechanism would be similar to the coordination procedures
already in place under the Radio Regulations," but would respond
to the problem of inertia created by the first come, first served regime by shifting more of the burden of adjustment onto incumbents in the satellite system. To effectuate the accommodation of a
new satellite if the parties reach an impasse, the ITU would have
64
to have the power to require adjustment of existing satellites.
Whether such empowerment is desirable or, more importantly, politically feasible is difficult to determine.
While this approach eliminates the disincentive to use improvements in technology that arises under an a priori allotment
plan, it is not clear that the benefits derived outweigh the potential
costs. Mandatory adjustment of existing satellites can be both expensive and inconvenient for providers and consumers of services
made possible by the displaced system. This approach would prove
particularly burdensome to countries-both advanced countries
and LDCs-located close to each other and/or in areas of heavy
traffic. Representatives of such countries might be obliged to engage in a never-ending stream of coordinating sessions which could
60 Variations on the detailed allotment plan have been suggested which attempt to deal
with some of its shortcomings and to improve its flexibility. See id. at 20-24.
6, Id. at 23.
0 Id. at 24.
63 See Radio Regulations at arts. 3-9A (cited in note 7).
e, In practice, the ITU does not have the ability to force the U.S.-or any country-to
obey its mandates, which could severely limit the effectiveness of the multilateral coordination approach.
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impose prohibitively high administrative costs.6 5 The U.S., however-which benefits from its geographic isolation and the technological poverty of its southern neighbors-stands to benefit from
this plan in that it would involve no a priori ceiling on the number
of slots assignable to any given country and will not result in a
more restrictive allotment which is inconsistent with its current
operations.
C.

Resource Pool Planning

Resource pool planning would involve the creation of a pool of
feasible orbital positions consisting of blocks of the spectrum associated with a portion of the orbital arc. 6 An international administrative entity would be required to manage the pool according to
the principles of equity and efficiency. 7 An ITU member planning
to orbit a satellite would forward its service requirements to the
pool manager whose role it would be to "provide for the requested
service requests from the resource pool and 'pack' the requested
assignments of various countries in a manner which causes the
least depletion of the pool."6 " Although preference should be given
to parties with the current ability to launch a satellite, LDCs willing to consolidate their abilities to form a regional group for the
provision of service could be given special consideration, particularly where they are in competition with advanced countries for
certain assignments.
Depending on the powers and flexibility granted to the manager, pool planning could facilitate the availability of the maximum number of feasible assignments. The pool manager could
utilize technological progress and/or restrictive technical parameters on operations to both expand the number of slots available in
the pool-through technologies which permit greater density of
satellites per cubic unit of space-and pack assignments so as to
ensure the most efficient use of the regional blocks of the orbital
arc. Countries, like the United States, which are geographically isolated or surrounded by neighbors with limited technological development, would benefit greatly from pool planning.6 9
" Rothblatt, 1984 Mich Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 26 (cited in note 55).

,6 Id. at 27.
67

Id.

For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach, see id. at 2728; see also, Second Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC, Gen. Dkt. No. 80-741 (F.C.C. 17714,
1982) (Comments of COMSAT).
" Since the U.S. is by far the dominant user in its part of the world the "regional
blocks" carved out of the GSO over that area would provide ample entry opportunities for
"
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Such a regime could be implemented quickly and without radically changing the structure of the ITU or creating a regulatory
body which did not previously exist. Considerably less delay and
administrative burden in accommodating requests make this plan
particularly attractive. Moreover, unless the pool manager determines that an a priori limit on the number of slots assignable to a
given country is preferable, the interests of advanced countries are
well served under this plan.
The drawback of pool planning is that it will not necessarily
increase the LDCs' access to the GSO. It is unclear how the pool
manager would respond to the often contradictory demands of equity and efficiency. If maintaining efficient use of the orbital blocks
is the overarching standard for determining who will receive assignments, it is likely that increasing levels of technology will be
necessary to satisfy the technical parameters for use as the orbital
blocks become more and more congested. LDCs which do not possess such technology will be severely limited in their ability to take
advantage of the access opportunities provided by the manager.
However, if one of the mandates of the international regime is to
provide equitable entry opportunities even in the face of orbit/
spectrum congestion, and the pool manager is given broad powers
to require existing networks to make adjustments within the block,
7
feasible access opportunities will still be open to LDCs. 1
D.

Provision of Service by Institutions

Finally, an international institution could provide satellite service as a supplement to domestic service. 71 Under this method,
guaranteed access to service through the institutional system
would replace the need for reserved positions in the orbit and frequency spectrum. The international institution could be functionally similar to INTELSAT. It could even evolve from INTELSAT
if certain modifications were made both in the present ownership
structure and in management controls and procedures. This alternative would probably meet with the approval of a number of advanced countries since it need not involve any artificial ceiling on
available allotments. 2 Most LDCs, however, would view this
method as an unsatisfactory alternative to ownership and control
U.S. systems. See Rothblatt, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 28 (cited in note 55).
70

See id. at 28 (such powers are critical to the regime's ability to mandate entry

opportunities).
7, Id. at 28.
71 Id. at 29.
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of their own systems, even though their access to services would be
guaranteed.
V.

THE

1985 WARC

When the 900 delegates of 111 ITU member nations (and observers from fourteen international organizations) convened in Geneva in August of 1985, their task was set out by Article 33 of the
1982 ITU Convention and Resolution BP. They were to formulate
a planning method which would "guarantee in practice for all
countries equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit and
the frequency bands allocated to the space services utilizing it, taking into account the special needs of developing countries and the
geographical situation of particular countries." 8 Still, in the words
of the Secretary-General of the ITU, the Conference would endeavor to find a "balanced solution" that would not only assure
that all ITU members could "start a satellite service on the basis
of equality," but also "avoid hampering the development . . . of

satellite technology aimed at improving spectrum and economic
4
viability.

7'

The proposed regulatory regime which emerged from WARC
ORB-1 has two features: a limited a priori allotment plan and improved procedures. The ITU has, accordingly, presented the package as a "dual plan." The allotment plan is to "permit each administration to satisfy requirements for national services from at least
one orbital position. ' 7 The improved procedures are to handle requirements which are not satisfied by the initial allotment, as well
as provide a mechanism for both the distribution of orbital slots as
they become available and the adjustment of existing systems to
76
accommodate new ones.

73 World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Orbit and
the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It, Addendum to Report to the Second Session
of the Conference § 3.2.1. (First Session, Geneva 1985) ("Addendum") (copy on file with the
University of Chicago Legal Forum).
7" ITU, Press Release at 2 (cited in note 10).
71 Addendum at § 3.3.1(a) (cited in note 73). The plan is to be established in the following bands 4500-4800 MHz, and 10.70-10.95 GHz, 11.20-11.45 GHz, and 12.75-13.25
GHz.
14 Id. at § 3.3.1(b). The improved procedures are to be applied in the following bands:
3700-4200 MHz, 5850-6425 MHz; and 10.95-11.20 GHz, 11.45-11.70 GHz (in Region 2),
12.50-12.75 GHz (in Regions 1 and 3), 14.00-14.50 GHz, 18.10-18.30 GHz, 18.30-20.20
GHz, and 27.00-30.00 GHz. The CCIR was asked to study the technical character of the
FSS in frequency band 20/30 GHz and to report to the second session of the Conference on
the possibility of a future plan for these bands.
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A. The Allotment Plan
The allotment plan itself affects only national systems providing domestic satellite service. 77 It guarantees access to the orbit/
spectrum resource by giving each ITU member at least one allotment. Each allotment consists of an orbital position in a predetermined arc and a minimum bandwidth within the bands identified
for planning.7" The plan, which is to form an integral part of the
Radio Regulations, is to be in effect for at least ten years, with the
second session of the Conference (WARC ORB-2, scheduled to
convene in 1988) deciding on its exact duration. 7 The plan may be
revised, if necessary, in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the Convention. 0
B.

The Improved Procedures

The principal component of the improved procedures is the
convening of periodic multilateral planning meetings (MPMs).
These meetings, for which there will be new and separate procedures added to the Radio Regulations, will constitute the "normal
process for gaining access to the GSO/spectrum. resources."81 The
nature and frequency of the meetings, and the binding force of the
determinations made there, are to be decided at the second session
of the Conference.82 Some suggested features of the MPM include:
(1) simplification of the advance publication procedure in Article
11 of the Radio Regulations; (2) proportional burden-sharing,
where appropriate, to ensure access to the orbit/spectrum; (3) the
use of further technical measures to resolve problems of space stall It is meant to ensure equitable allocation of orbital slots among countries competing
for positions and does not apply to INTELSAT for example, which is given preference due
to the number of countries to which it provides service.
10 In addition, the allotment practically determines the service area given that the
placement of a satellite dictates the geographic areas to which it can transmit. The
bandwidth associated with each allotment shall be 800 MHZ (§ 3.3.4.4). The size and position of the predetermined arc, a feature designed to increase flexibility by making it possible
to modify an orbital position within the limits of the arc with a minimum of disruption of
service, was found to necessitate intersessional study by the CCIR (§ 3.3.4.5). The study will
be completed prior to WARC ORB-2 in 1988.
Many of the details of the dual plan remain to be worked out at WARC ORB-2. Exactly
how allotments are to be determined and the plan's effect on existing allotments are presently unclear. No country will be asked to give up a currently held position in the near
future, but redistribution will probably be necessary in the long-run and how it is to be
handled is uncertain.
11 Addendum at § 3.3.4.6 (cited in note 73).
80 Id.

Id. at § 3.3.5.1.
82 Id.
11
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tion coordination; (4) consideration of the existing systems in the
relevant bands; and (5) provisions for bilateral consultations between administrations, and the availability of assistance from the
IFRB.8 3 A collateral, but emphasized, purpose of the MPMs is to
provide a mechanism through which administrations with adjacent
territories can combine all or part of their allotments to ensure regional or sub-regional service.8 4 Most analysts agree with the ITU
that expanded use of regional and sub-regional systems is a desirable and efficient way in which to expand the availability of global
55
service to all parts of the world.
C.

The Impact of the Dual Plan on Growth in Trade in Telecommunications Services

In evaluating the potential impact of the ITU's dual plan (assuming it is adopted in its present form by the second session of
the Conference) on the provision of telecommunications services, it
should be recalled that it was not one of the goals of the Conference to create a regulatory environment that would stimulate international trade in this area. That is, while the ITU did intend to
foster availability of satellite telecommunications to all countries,
specifically the developing countries, this was to be accomplished
through the creation of real access opportunities for those countries rather than through competitive institutional provision.
To facilitate the provision of telecommunications services to
an increasing number of global consumers, a regulatory regime
should estabish an environment in which the overall channel capacity of the orbit/spectrum resource (i.e., the ability to accommodate a large number of powerful and efficient satellites) could grow
to the extent possible to accommodate increasing demand."6 Such a
regime would provide liberal resource access procedures to create
freer entry by new providers.87 This would require a body of regulations geared toward controlling interference among the users by
encouraging the development and use of new technologies (e.g.,
more sophisticated antennas for transmission and reception of
more tightly focused radio signals).
When evaluated according to these standards, the implemen-

83

Id. at § 3.3.5.3.

',
SB

Id. at § 3.3.4.1.
See, Martin A. Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communications, 18 Stan. J.

Int'l L. 1, 21 (1982). See also Abram Chayes, Satellite Broadcasting 8 (1973).
" Rothblatt, 18 Stan. J. Int'l L. at 17 (cited in note 85).
87 Id.

at 18.
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tation of the dual allotment plan would tend to hinder growth in
telecommunications service trade in a variety of ways. First, the a
priori plan has the drawbacks discussed earlier: many technically
feasible positions will go unused by countries which lack the capital, technological and/or professional resources required to establish satellite systems while other countries with the ability to meet
increasing demand in the international market will be denied the
positions they need because of the artificial ceiling the a priori
plan places on the number of feasible assignments available to any
party. Moreover, private carriers in the more advanced countries
must vie for a more limited supply of positions-those assigned to
their country of origin. These results combine to place an outside
limit on both short-term and long-term growth to the extent that
growth is tied to the availability of new assignments. Furthermore,
since each allotment includes both a frequency bandwidth and orbital position, it also implicitly includes a circumscribed service
area. In fact, it is conceivable that the ability of an international
carrier to provide services to a pre-assigned area will become more
costly and complicated.
The ITU did decide to increase the level of acceptable interference. 8 This will permit a proportionate reduction in the required distance between space stations, and, therefore, allow a
greater number of space stations to coexist in the GSO. Given the
proposed technical measures for harmonizing the arrangement of
neighboring satellites, 89 however, the costs involved in utilizing this
modification to permit the entry of new systems into the GSO
seem to fall primarily on present users. These costs may stem from
operational adjustments, such as adjustments of antenna attitudes
on space and earth stations or, in the case of less powerful systems,
increased interference from other systems and the resulting lower
quality transmissions. This approach, while probably beneficial in
the long run, will also impose increased costs on telecommunications entities whose systems are presently under construction. Adjustments will have to be made in the operational features of these
systems to enable satellites to avoid the increased interference
from neighboring space stations while taking advantage of the new

S"

The levels of acceptable interference were increased from 2000 pWOp to 2500

pWOp. See World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Orbit
and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It, Report to the Second Session § 3.4.3.2.8
(First Session, Geneva 1985) ("Report") (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal
Forum).
" See generally id. at § 3.4.
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technical parameters promulgated by the ITU.9 0 Of course, these
costs must be balanced against the benefits accruing to countries
which would not be able to launch satellites but for the increase in
the acceptable level of interference.
Of the technical measures set out in the Report to the Second
Session of the Conference, potentially most damaging to trade in
telecommunications services is, ironically, one which was designed
to maximize efficient use of the orbit/spectrum: the measure proposing shifts in the positioning of satellites as a viable harmonization method.9 1 If implemented, this measure will impose high costs
on present orbit occupants in the short-run, and significant costs
on all administrations over the long-run. Satellite support systems
will have to be modified: greater fuel capacity, more powerful propulsion mechanisms, and more complex "telecommand" systems
(which permit satellite positioning to be controlled from Earth)
will be necessary. Even after these become standard features on
satellites, the costs of shifting a satellite's position will be high for
both the providers and the consumers of services given both the
sunk costs of the shift procedure and the costs in disrupted
services.
The ITU was aware both that the costs of implementing a
plan should not outweigh its overall benefits, 9 and that demand
for satellite networks varies from frequency band to frequency
band and from region to region. The ITU's response to these factors, however, again prompted by concern for efficient use, may be
damaging to efforts to increase trade in response to high demand.
In an effort to create the optimal balance between the costs of individual networks and the total capacity of the orbit and spectrum,
the ITU found that "it may be feasible to set mild constraints for
some frequency bands and orbital arcs, where the demand is low,
even though more stringent constraints may have to be applied

90A number of developments make such modifications technologically feasible, though
expensive. Earth stations can be modified by improving the performance of antennas by
increasing gain and size, as well as improving "side-lobe discrimination" (a basic feature of
antennas that determines their sensitivity to interference from other networks). For space
stations, antenna power and transmission intensity can be improved to employ "contiguous
spot-beam" coverage of service areas; such coverage utilizes a number of efficient, focused
beams to cover an area that was previously covered by a larger beam. Contiguous spot-beam
coverage reduces the amount of overlap that occurs among adjacent service areas. See David
Withers, Technical Means for Expanding the Fixed Satellite Service, 52 Telecomm. J. 467,
468-469 (1985).
Report at § 3.4.3.4.2.5 (cited in note 88).
"
See id. at § 3.4.2.1.4.
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where the demand is high. '1 3 This possibility of setting varied constraints and interference levels was made the subject of an intersessional study by the CCIR, the results of which will be released
prior to the second session.
The multilateral planning meetings may be able to offset some
of these consequences. The MPMs will be empowered to consider
technical measures when attempting to create access opportunities
through regulated coordination. While one of the goals of the dual
plan is to accommodate technological progress, the ability of
MPMs to accomplish that goal remains to be seen.
Although the MPMs provide a structure for frequent talks,
politics will inevitably create obstacles to the envisioned technocratic solutions. It is also not yet clear whether the MPMs will operate to encourage the development of regional and subregional
groups for the provision of telecommunications services to countries involved. The success or failure of MPMs, which are the cornerstone of the improved procedures, in these areas is certain to
have an impact on the availability of new assignments for all providers of international telecommunications services.
D.

Orbit/Spectrum Leasing: Softening the Short-term Effects of
the Dual Allotment Plan

It may be possible to avoid "resource starvation" among the
private and public providers of telecommunications services in advanced countries until the time when LDCs can make use of their
allotments by permitting a lease market to operate under the dual
plan. 4 A viable lease market approach must, however, be tied to

93 Id.
94 See Harvey Levin, The Polical Economy of Orbit Spectrum Leasing, 1984 Mich. Y.B.
Int'l Legal Stud. 41 (1984). For a pure market approach to orbit/spectrum resource allocation see, Clas G. Wihlborg and Per Magnus Wijkman, Outer Space Resources in Efficient
and Equitable Use: New Frontiers for Old Principles, 24 J.L. & Econ. 23 (1981).
One question that arises when analyzing allotment plans is whether or not the preassignment of orbital positions (as part of a broader allotment scheme which also includes
frequency band assignments) constitutes "national appropriation" in violation of Article 2
of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Article 2 limits the extent of free and equal exploration,
exploitation, and use of the space environment permitted (and encouraged) under Article 1,
by prohibiting national appropriation of any part of the space environment.
The now infrequent assertion by LDCs that the placement and use of geostationary
satellites under the present system constitutes national appropriation is incorrect for two
reasons. First, the relatively short lifespan of geostationary satellites (approximately ten
years, although it is gradually increasing), and their almost immediate removal from orbit
after they cease operation, prevent appropriation. Second, both treaty and international
customary law require that a state intend to appropriate the territory in question and states
using the GSO intend only to use it for a period of time. The issue becomes less clear,
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the goals which the ITU seeks to achieve through its own planning
strategy: (1) equitable access, (2) economic efficiency, (3) widespread service availability, (4) technical efficiency, and (5) encouragement of technical progress 5 The overall target of this lease
market approach would be to distribute the orbit/spectrum resource to its highest valued present use, while protecting the longterm interests of LDCs and moving toward optimal levels of interference and congestion. 6
A lease market approach would attempt to accommodate the
interests of both developed and lesser-developed countries through
a mechanism which would preserve the "reservations" given to
LDCs under the ITU allotment plan, while making unused orbit/
spectrum resources available to bidders in the open market. Bids
would be made directly to the current holder of the assignment,
97
and rent payments could take any form agreeable to the parties.
To ensure that hold-outs, particularly those in heavy traffic regions
and channels, would not adversely affect market prices, and that
lessees would not take advantage of assignment holders, an ITU
arbitral tribunal could be charged with setting fair values for slots
in the orbital arc.9 8 In addition, certain broad regulations limiting
however, where long-term assignments are distributed subject to the decisions of the assignees as to use. Arguing along those lines, Carl Christol has suggested that "such an allocation
could be treated as an approval of national appropriation of a segment of the space environment." Carl Q. Christol, The Geostationary Orbital Position As a National Resource of the
Space Environment, 26 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 5, 11 (1979). The ITU, obviously, does not
agree. See, Butler, 5 J. Space L. at 97-98 (cited in note 57). Because Article 2 of the treaty
speaks of "national appropriation by claim of sovereignty," assignments distributed by the
ITU for a predetermined period of time and for circumscribed use would probably not violate it. For an early discussion of this issue, see Comment, Utilization of the Geostationary
Orbit-A Need for Orbital Allocation?, 13 Colum. J. Trans'l L. 101 (1974).
" Levin, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 45 (cited in note 94).
Id. at 47.
For example, payments could be calculated according to a flat rate, they could be a
percentage of gross revenues generated by the satellite occupying the leased position, or
they could take the form of a reduced rate on domestic service.
"s Levin, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 47-48 (cited in note 94). The tribunal
would take into account the linkage between an orbital slot and a frequency band provided
for under the dual plan when determining the fair value. One problem with this suggestion
is that, because orbital positions are not fungible commodities, setting values can be technically and administratively quite difficult. Due to the curvature of the earth, and the need for
a direct line of sight between the satellite and the earth-stations with which it operates,
orbital slots lying over the middle of the ocean or over the desert are generally less usable
than those lying over populated areas. Suggestions have been made to "delink" these two
components, but science and practice continue to favor linkage.
.Moreover, it has been strongly contended that GSO "becomes a usable resource only
through radio links connecting the satellite to the transmitting and receiving earth stations." See Sarkar, Orbital Positions at 450 (cited in note 33). Because of this, "geostationary orbital positions and frequency spectrum [bands] cannot be separated from one another
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permissible use of the leased positions, such as ceilings on acceptable interference, would be enacted to protect the value of the
lessee's investment.99 In all other respects, however, an effort
would be made to give market forces free reign to distribute the
resource among competing administrations possessing the ability
to orbit satellites at that time. The duration of each lease could be
subject to an outside limit so as to assure frequent turn-over of
available slots.
One problem commonly noted by advocates of market allocation is that orbit/spectrum rights are "over-specified": assignments
are defined in such detail that they are unusable by any country
other than the one to which they have been granted. 100 This is
clear from the manner in which assignments are distributed under
the dual plan of WARC ORB-i, the most basic specification being
the linkage of a particular orbital position with a particular channel or frequency. Advocates of market solutions suggest that a
more "loosely packed" allocation plan, involving at a minimum the
delinking of the two components of the orbital slot and the frequency band, would be desirable.10 1 Orbit rights could be vested
not in a single slot in the arc, but within a range of available slots
lying along a segment of the GSO. Under such an arrangement,
international orbit/spectrum brokers, or an international organization, could package and repackage combinations of orbital positions and frequencies to better accommodate the needs of individual lessors.'0 2 While such a delinking might result in considerable
complexity were it completely to replace the current allotment
method, it would make a lease market distribution mechanism
more effective in distributing the temporarily unused slots to their
most able user.

...[and] must be considered equally and simultaneously for the purposes of technical criteria as well as of regulation of all space radio communication services." Id. At present, ITU
allocations do link frequency band use with orbital position (as part of the IFRB effort to
control interference), and there are no indications that this policy is changing.
"gSuch regulations could simply require that all Radio Regulations be adhered to, or
they could demand more. See Levin, 1984 Mich Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 46 (cited in note
94).
100 Id. at 51. See also, Wihlborg and Wijkman, 24 J.L. & Econ. at 24, 28-29 (cited in
note 94).
o'Levin, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 51. See also, Wihlborg and Wijkman, 24
J.L. & Econ. at 28-29 (cited in note 94) (arguing that the property rights granted to occupiers of orbital positions, in this case the initial assignees, must also be made more "complete"
if any true market incentives are to develop).
02 Levin, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 52 (cited in note 94).
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CONCLUSION

The ITU's dual allotment plan, which may or may not be
adopted in its present form by the Second Session of the Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Orbit and the Planning of
Space Services Utilizing It (WARC ORB-2), is as much a creature
of international politics as it is of technical requirements. Third
World countries' demands that they be accorded equitable access
to the orbit/spectrum provided the substantive basis of all planning discussions, and made the implemention of a priori planning
almost inevitable given the LDCs' numerical dominance in the
ITU.
The goal of guaranteeing equitable access in practice constitutes the theoretical underpinning of the dual plan. Yet, the specific issues of how to divide up the orbit/spectrum resource, what
weight to accord the various needs and abilities of the countries to
take part in the plan, and how best to ensure efficient use of the
resource are more difficult to resolve. Equity seems to require that
the use of the orbit/spectrum be regulated in a manner that would
allow the greatest number of countries to occupy positions without
interfering with one another. Efficiency requires allocating the
marginal unit of the regulated resource to its highest valued use at
that time.
To simultaneously acheive the goals of equitable access and
efficient use requires a plan which both guarantees fixed rights and
ensures flexibility. The ITU's dual plan is one effort to achieve this
requirement. The most desirable combination of the two components will, of course, depend on where one sits on the continuum of
technological and capital wealth. The costs and benefits of the plan
recommended by WARC ORB-1 should therefore be judged not
merely on the basis of the extent to which both goals are maximized, but also on the basis of the extent to which the political
realities reflected in the ITU's planning priorities are addressed.
Since the ITU's chief priority was providing for equitable access the dual plan is a positive step toward achieving this goal.
Every country will in fact be able to meet its domestic satellite
needs from at least one orbital position and associated frequency
band. With respect to flexibility, any increase in the ability of the
plan to accommodate quickly changing requirements and technological progress would seem to require some collateral modification
in the technical parameters upon which the present allotment
scheme relies for regulated use. This is to be the domain of the
MPMs, and their success or failure in making such accommoda-
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tions without compromising the integrity of the mechanisms for
equitable access remains to be seen.
Given the impending implementation of the dual plan, an official accession, in the form of a CCIR recommendation, to a lease
market mechanism would be a good way to moderate the inefficient effects of the plan by providing entry opportunities for new
satellite systems so that satellite telecommunication services could
expand in the short run to meet demand. The formal or informal
acceptance of this approach by the ITU membership may well suffice to stave off detrimental limitations on slot availability until
technological progress allows discrete slots and the orbit/spectrum
itself to handle higher volumes of traffic.
Finally, the implementation of the ITU's dual plan may work
to encourage progress and development in two important areas:
technology transfer and terrestrial communications technology.
Resource scarcity and restrictive use regulations may encourage
developed countries to liberalize technology transfer policies in
favor of Third World nations. In the event that modification of the
ITU technical parameters governing use of the orbit/spectrum depends on the ability of a majority of members to utilize state-ofthe-art telecommunications technology, developed countries may
find it useful to improve the quality of technological information
available to lesser developed ITU members. The greater the channel capacity of each satellite orbited by Third World countries, the
more likely it is that these countries will be willing to make unused
positions available to satisfy market demand in developed countries. It is conceivable that small countries which, singly or even
together, comprise small coverage areas, may be able to satisfy
their needs without using their entire assignment if they have the
appropriate technology. Hence, giving Third World countries access to advanced technology may reduce their requirements sufficiently to make available positions which developed countries had
lost access to upon implementation of the plan.
Second, as problems of congestion in space increase, and regulations governing the use of space become more restrictive, developed countries will be well-advised to support the research and development of terrestrial communications technology, particularly
for use between heavy traffic transmission points. By developing
terrestrial communications technologies and decreasing the unit
cost of utilizing them, some traffic can be taken out of the realm of
space telecommunications to reduce growth pressures there. The
development of telecommunications technology, put to strategic
and economic combined use on earth and in space, will continue to
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expand the ways in which global demand for communication can
be met.
The ITU's dual plan is an excellent attempt to balance today's
technological and countervailing political forces in order to achieve
a viable allocation of the orbit/spectrum resource. Yet the negotiations make clear that political issues will continue to pervade the
decision-making process and that a solution can no longer be
reached on purely technical grounds.
Eric D. Altholzt

t I wish to thank Elizabeth Wittenberg for her assistance in the development and research of this comment.

